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Abstract
Suppose we are given a set W of logical structures, or possible worlds, a set of logical formulas called possible data and a
logical formula ϕ. We then consider the classification problem of determining in the limit and almost always correctly whether a
possible worldM satisfies ϕ, from a complete enumeration of the possible data that are true inM. One interpretation of almost
always correctly is that the classification might be wrong on a set of possible worlds of measure 0, with respect to some natural
probability distribution over the set of possible worlds. Another interpretation is that the classifier is only required to classify a set
W ′ of possible worlds of measure 1, without having to produce any claim in the limit on the truth of ϕ for the members of the
complement of W ′ in W . We compare these notions with absolute classification of W with respect to a formula that is almost
always equivalent to ϕ in W , hence we investigate whether the set of possible worlds on which the classification is correct is
definable. We mainly work with the probability distribution that corresponds to the standard measure on the Cantor space, but we
also consider an alternative probability distribution proposed by Solomonoff and contrast it with the former. Finally, in the spirit
of the kind of computations considered in Logic programming, we address the issue of computing almost correctly in the limit
witnesses to leading existentially quantified variables in existential formulas.
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1. Introduction
Paradigms of inductive inference are often highly idealized, even for those that impose very tight restrictions on
the learning scenario. There might be constraints on how data are presented to a learner, or on the resources that are
made available to a learner, or on the criterion that formalizes what is meant by ‘learning.’ Still learning paradigms
are often ‘merciless’ when it comes to qualifying a learner as successful. They expect a successful learner to be
correct with respect to all possible realities (languages in the numerical setting, structures in the logical setting) of the
paradigm. This is certainly an extreme demand, that can be the object of theoretical investigation, but that would not
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be imposed in most practical contexts. Agents or processes are nor expected to be infallible. Allowing the learning
process to succeed with respect to almost all realities – intuitively, successfully learning with probability 1 – appears
as a reasonable requirement that deserves to be investigated.
Probabilistic elements have already been considered in inductive inference, but they relate more to the learning
process than to the class of languages learnt by a machine (sample references are [7,9,13,14,17]). For example,
learning functions in the limit with probability 1/n turns out to be equivalent to having n nonprobabilistic learners such
that at least one of them succeeds [14,17]. Furthermore, most concepts have a break-even point at some probability
c < 1 in the sense that whenever such concepts are learnable with probability c, they are already learnable by
a deterministic machine [1]. Meyer [12] showed that exact monotonic and exact conservative learning with any
probability c < 1 is more powerful than deterministic learning; still in the case c = 1, the probabilistic and
deterministic variants are again the same. In [8], the notions of effective measure and category are used to discuss
the relative sizes of inferable sets and their complements.
An example for a setting in inductive inference where learning with probability 1 is more powerful than
deterministic learning is the following. Assign to each set A to be learnt the distribution pA with pA(x) = 2−1−x
for x ∈ A, pA(x) = 0 for x /∈ A and pA(#) = ∑x /∈A 2−1−x . Then any class of sets that is learnable from an
informant is also learnable from a text with probability 1, provided that for every member A of the class, the elements
of a text for A are drawn with probability pA. As some classes are learnable from an informant but not from a text,
these classes witness that learning from almost all texts is more powerful than learning from all texts.
The main reason why probabilistic elements are restricted to the learning process and not to the class of realities
being considered is that in a countable domain, ‘almost all objects’ would normally mean ‘cofinitely many objects’
and finite exceptions can often be handled by suitably patching the machine. Therefore it is much more appropriate
to consider classification where one deals with a continuum of possible realities which can be identified with the
Cantor-Space. Then ‘almost all’ can be interpreted in two major ways: ‘of second category’ as defined in topology, or
‘of measure 1’ as defined in measure theory.
Classification was already implicitly considered by recursion theorists when they investigated computation in the
limit relative to an oracle, which subsumes classification [15]. Ben-David [3] characterized classification in the limit in
topological terms. Subsequent work then established a connection between classification on one side and logic on the
other side [2,10]. In [11] the relationship between classification and topology was brought one step further, by casting
the classification in a logical setting that considered arbitrary sets of data, each set determining a particular topology
and arbitrary sets of structures. Of particular importance in [11] are (usually axiomatized) classes of structures
consisting of Henkin structures only, where every individual of the domain is denoted by a term in the underlying
language. The set of atomic sentences (that is, closed atomic formulas) true in such structures uniquely determines
the structure and can be identified with a point in the Cantor space. A probability distribution can then be defined on
the set of structures which represent the possible realities, that generalizes the classical probability distribution on the
Cantor space. Still it is legitimate to consider alternative probability distributions on the set of possible realities. This
paper will explore one such alternative. It is also natural to examine what can be derived from the assumption that
the set of possible realities is equipped with an arbitrary probability distribution—we will provide one such general
result.
The setting chosen for this paper is a particular instance of the logical framework investigated in [11]. It conceives
of a logical paradigm as a vocabulary V , a set W of structures over V , or possible worlds, and a set D of closed
formulas over V , or possible data. Important cases of possible data are obtained by taking for D the set of atomic
sentences or the set of basic sentences (atomic sentences or their negations). Both choices determine counterparts to
the numerical notions of a text and an informant, in the form of enumerations of all possible data that are true in an
underlying possible worldM, yielding an environment forM. Given a formula ϕ, we consider the task of determining
in the limit, from an environment for a possible worldM, whetherM satisfies ϕ. In other words, the task is to classify
a possible world as a member of one of two classes: the class of structures that satisfy ϕ and the class of structures
that don’t. But we allow the classification to fail on a set of environments for a small set of possible worlds—either of
first category or of measure 0.
It is natural to distinguish between failing to converge to some answer and misclassifying. In the case of
misclassification with respect to ϕ, an interesting question is whether perfect classification of W is achieved on the
basis of another formula ψ , whose set of models in W is equal to the set of models of ϕ up to a set of measure 0.
Whether the failure to classify correctly is due to nonconvergence or to genuine misclassification, we only measure
116 S. Jain et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 397 (2008) 114–128
on which class of possible worlds M a correct classification is achieved from all environments for M. We do not
assume that the possible data are generated following some underlying probability distribution, nor do we impose any
condition on the speed of convergence. In other words, we remain in the realm of inductive inference and our use of
probabilities is essentially different to their role in the PAC framework.
We now proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notions, that we apply to the classification task
in Sections 3–7. More precisely, Section 3 is based on arbitrary measures whereas from Sections 4–6, we focus on
the measure that corresponds to the usual measure on the Cantor space. In Section 7, we show that we get a different
picture if the measure proposed by Solomonoff [16] is used instead. In Section 8 we get back to the measure on the
Cantor space and particularize the framework to ϕ being of the form ∃xψ(x), with the aim of not only classifying ϕ,
but of computing in the limit a witness to the existentially quantified variable x . Provided thatW is axiomatizable by
a logic program, this corresponds to ‘error tolerant’ computations in Logic programming, where ψ is assumed to be
quantifier free or to only contain bounded quantifiers [20]. When ψ is universal, and also with some assumptions on
W , this corresponds to ‘error tolerant’ computations in Limiting resolution [6]. We conclude in Section 9.
2. Absolute and probabilistic classification
Let a class X be given. The class of finite sequences of members of X , including the empty sequence (), is
represented by X?. The length of σ ∈ X? is denoted lt(σ ). The class of sequences of members of X of length ω
is represented by Xω. Given a member σ of X? and a member τ of either X? or Xω, we write σ ⊂ τ to denote that σ
is a strict initial segment of τ .
Given a nonempty vocabulary V , that is, a set of (possibly nullary) predicate and function symbols, we shall
consider both first-order formulas over V and monadic second-order formulas over V , built from the symbols in
V , equality, the usual Boolean operators, first-order variables and quantifiers over those, and in the case of monadic
second-order formulas, unary predicate variables and quantifiers over those. A first-order sentence over V refers to a
closed first-order formula over V . The same convention applies to monadic second-order sentences over V . We adopt
the following conventions.
• We use V to denote a vocabulary containing at least a constant 0, a unary function symbol s and a unary predicate
symbol P , possibly enriched with either the binary function symbol + or with the binary function symbols + and
∗. Given n ∈ N, we denote by n the term obtained from 0 by n applications of s (hence n + 1 = s(n) for all n ∈ N).
We say that V is standard if V consists of 0, s and P only.
• We use L to denote a language equal either to the set of first-order sentences over V or to the set of monadic
second-order sentences over V .
• We use D to denote an infinite set of first-order sentences over V , referred to as possible data.
• We useW to denote a set of structures over V , referred to as possible worlds, all of whose individuals interpret a
unique closed term of the form n, n ∈ N. When V contains+, we assume that the interpretation of+ in all members
of W is given by the standard interpretation of + in N. When V contains ∗, we assume that the interpretation of
∗ in all members ofW is given by the standard interpretation of ∗ in N. We assume that for every subset X of N,
there exists a uniqueM ∈W with {n ∈ N :M |= P(n)} = X .
We say term for term over V and sentence for member of L. Given T ⊆ L, ModW (T ) represents the set of models of
T inW . Given ϕ ∈ L, we write ModW (ϕ) for ModW ({ϕ}). We will also use the following terminology.
Definition 1. Given D ⊆ L and a possible worldM, we define the D-diagram ofM as the set of all members of D
that are true inM.
Note that by convention, every subset of D = {P(n) : n ∈ N} is the D-diagram of some possible world. We use
environment to refer to an enumeration of the D-diagram of a member ofW .
Definition 2. Given a possible worldM, an environment forM is any member e of (D ∪ {]})ω such that for all ϕ ∈ D,
ϕ occurs in e iff ϕ is true inM.
The D-diagram of a possible worldM can be empty, in which caseM will have a unique environment, namely
the ω-sequence ]]]]] . . . , with the intended meaning of the symbol ] being “no datum provided”. We denote by µ a
measure onW such that for all ϕ ∈ L, µ(ModW (ϕ)) is measurable. Of particular importance is the (unique) measure
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onW that is directly derived from the standard measure on the Cantor space. More precisely, put D = {P(n) : n ∈ N}.
The D-diagram of a possible world can then be identified with a point in the Cantor space. The next definition makes
the relationship explicit. It uses the relationship to define the standard measure onW , as well as the topological notions
of sets of first and second category. Recall that a subset of a topological space X is of first category if it is of the form⋃
n∈N Bn where for all n ∈ N and for all nonempty open sets O , O contains a nonempty open set that is disjoint from
Bn ; a subset of X is of second category if it is not of first category.
Definition 3. Given a possible worldM, the standard informant forM is the (unique) member e of {0, 1}ω such that
for all n ∈ N, e(n) = 1 iffM |= P(n).
• We say that µ is standard iff for all subsets W ofW , the following holds. Let S be the set of standard informants
of the members of W . Then µ(W ) is defined iff S is Lebesgue measurable in the Cantor space. Moreover, if µ(W )
is defined then it is equal to the measure of S in the Cantor space.
• Let a setW of possible worlds be given. Let S be the set of standard informants of the members ofW . If S is of first,
respectively, second, category in the Cantor space then we say that W is of first, respectively, second, category.
Note that in the case D = {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}, an environment for M can be identified with the standard
informant forM.
Definition 4. Two sentences ϕ and ψ are said to be almost equivalent iff µ(ModW (ϕ ↔ ¬ψ)) is null.
Given σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})?, cnt(σ ) denotes the set of members of D that occur in σ . The proofs of many propositions
will make use of the next technical definition.
Definition 5. We say that a member σ of (L ∪ {]})? is consistent inW just in the case there exists a memberM of
W such thatM |= cnt(σ ).
The classification task will be performed by a classifier, defined next.
Definition 6. Given a set D of sentences, a D-classifier is a partial function from (D ∪ {]})? into {0, 1}. We say
classifier for D-classifier.
The following pair of definitions capture the absolute notion of classification.
Definition 7. Let a classifier f and a subsetW ′ ofW be given.
Given a subset W ofW , we say that f classifiesW ′ in the limit following W just in the case for allM ∈ W ′ and
environments e forM:
• M ∈ W iff {σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? : σ ⊂ e and f (σ ) = 1} is cofinite;
• M /∈ W iff {σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? : σ ⊂ e and f (σ ) = 0} is cofinite.
Given a sentence ϕ, we say that f classifies W ′ in the limit following ϕ iff f classifies W ′ in the limit following
ModW (ϕ).
Definition 8. Given ϕ ∈ L andW ′ ⊆ W , we say thatW ′ is classifiable, respectively, computably classifiable, in the
limit following ϕ iff some classifier, respectively, computable classifier, classifiesW ′ in the limit following ϕ.
We are interested in classifiers that classify all possible worlds, but misclassify a subset of W of measure 0, as
captured in the next pair of definitions.
Definition 9. Let a classifier f and a sentence ϕ be given. We say that f classifiesW in the limit following ϕ almost
everywhere iff there exists a subset W ofW such that:
• µ(ModW (ϕ)4W ) is null;
• f classifiesW in the limit following W .
Definition 10. Given ϕ ∈ L, we say thatW is classifiable, respectively, computably classifiable, in the limit following
ϕ almost everywhere iff some classifier, respectively, computable classifier, classifiesW in the limit following ϕ almost
everywhere.
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3. General measures
We start with the simple observation that in measure-theoretic terms, misclassification of a small set of possible
worlds implies absolute classification of almost all possible worlds:
Property 11. Let a sentence ϕ be such thatW is classifiable in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere. Then there
exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) = 1 that is classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
The well-known relationships between classification in the limit and Σ2 sentences has a counterpart in the
probabilistic setting being investigated.
Proposition 12. Suppose that D is closed under negation. Let a sentence
ϕ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qnxnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
be given, such that for any closed terms t1, . . . , tn , ψ(t1, . . . , tn) is a finite Boolean combination of members of D.
Then there exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) = 1 such thatW ′ is classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. Assume that D is closed under negation. Let a sentence ϕ be of the form
Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qnxnψ(x1, . . . , xn)
where n ∈ N, Q1, Q2, . . . , Qn are either existential or universal quantifiers, and ψ(t1, . . . , tn) is a finite Boolean
combination of D for all closed terms t1, t2, . . . , tn . Let τ0, τ1, . . . be an enumeration of all closed terms. Remember
that µ is chosen in such a way that ModW (ϕ) is measurable. Moreover, by the choice ofW , the set of models inW
of a closed formula of the form ∃xχ(x) is equal to the set of models inW of∨{χ(k) : k ∈ N}; also the set of models
inW of a closed formula of the form ∀xχ(x) is equal to the set of models inW of∧{χ(k) : k ∈ N}. We infer that
for all d ∈ N, there exists id1 , . . . , idn ∈ N with the following property. For all d ∈ N and m ≤ n, let ϕdm denote
Q1 j1 < id1 Q2 j2 < i
d
2 . . . Qm jm < i
d
m Qm+1xm+1 . . . Qnxnψ(τ j1 , . . . , τ jm , xm+1, . . . , xn).
Then for all d ∈ N and m < n, µ(ModW (ϕdm)∆ModW (ϕdm+1)) < 2−d/n. Note that for all d ∈ N, ϕd0 = ϕ and
µ(ModW (ϕd0 )∆ModW (ϕ
d
n )) < 2
−d .
Let a classifier f be defined as follows. First modify ϕ0n such that ϕ
0
n is not satisfiable inW , in order to avoid that
f be undefined on some input. Let σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? be given. Let d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |σ |} be greatest such that it can be
decided from the data seen so far whether these data are consistent with ϕdn inW: this can be done for at least those
d ∈ N such that for all j1 < id1 , j2 < id2 , . . . , jn < idn and for all θ ∈ D that occur in ψ(τ j1 , τ j2 , . . . , τ jn ) either θ or¬θ is one of the data seen so far. Thus d is monotonically increasing and unbounded in the number of received data.
Define f (σ ) to be 1 if µ(ModW (ϕdn )) > 0.5, and 0 otherwise. LetW ′ be the set of all possible worlds in which the
interpretation of ϕd0 is equal to the interpretation of ϕ
d
n for almost all d. As ModW (ϕd0 ) and ModW (ϕ
d
n ) differ by a set
of measure 2−d at most,W ′ has measure 1. Moreover, f classifiesW ′ following ϕ, which completes the proof of the
proposition. 
4. Failing to classify versus misclassifying
In this section, as well as in Sections 5, 6 and 8, we assume that µ is standard, as defined in Definition 3.
The first use of the standard measure is to show that the converse of Property 11 does not necessarily hold. Indeed,
a classifier that correctly classifies a subsetW ′ ofW of measure 1 might be forced to diverge on some environments
for some members ofW \W ′. The next proposition shows that this might indeed happen.
Proposition 13. Suppose that V is enriched with+ only, L is the set of first-order sentences andD = {P(n),¬P(n) :
n ∈ N}. Then there exists a sentence ϕ with the following properties.
• There exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) = 1 such thatW ′ is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
• W is not classifiable in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere.
Proof. Write x ≤ y for ∃z(x + z = y) and x < y for x ≤ y ∧ x 6= y. Define
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• a formula ψ(x) whose meaning is that P(y) holds for all y strictly between x2 and x ;• a sentence ϕ whose meaning is that ψ(x) holds for finitely many x’s only, and the maximum x such that ψ(x)
holds is even.
Formally,
ψ(x) ≡ ∀y((x < y + y ∧ y < x)→ P(y)) and
ϕ ≡ ∃x(ψ(x + x) ∧ ∀y(ψ(y)→ y ≤ x + x)).
Note that for all possible worldsM, the reduct ofM to {0, s,+, <} is isomorphic to N with the standard interpretation
of 0, s, + and <. Also note that for all M,N ∈ W that agree on all members of D, N |= ϕ iff M |= ϕ. Let a
computable classifier f be defined as follows. Let a member σ of (D ∪ {]})? be given. Let n ∈ N be maximal such
that for all m < n, either P(m) or ¬P(m) occurs in σ , and all models of cnt(σ ) ∩ {P(m),¬P(m) : m < n} in W
are models of ψ(n). Put f (σ ) = 1 if n is even; put f (σ ) = 0 otherwise. Let W be the set of allM ∈ W for which
there exists infinitely many n ∈ N withM |= ψ(n). For all n ≥ 2, the set of models of ψ(n) in W is of measure
bounded by 2−( n2−1), hence the set Wn of models of ∃x(x ≥ n ∧ ψ(x)) converges to 0 when n converges to infinity.
Since W ⊆ Wn for all n ≥ 2, it follows that µ(W ) = 0. Moreover, it is immediately verified that
• for allM ∈ ModW (ϕ) and environments e forM, f outputs 1 in response to cofinitely many finite initial segments
of e;
• for allM ∈ ModW (¬ϕ) \ W and environments e forM, f outputs 0 in response to cofinitely many finite initial
segments of e.
This shows thatW \W is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
Let a classifier g be given. Suppose for a contradiction that g classifiesW in the limit following some subset W ′ of
W with µ(ModW (ϕ)4W ′) = 0. Note that for all σ ∈ D? that are consistent inW , neither µ(ModW (cnt(σ ) ∪ {ϕ}))
nor µ(ModW (cnt(σ ) ∪ {¬ϕ})) is equal to 0. Hence, there are extensions σ1, σ2 ∈ D? of σ such that cnt(σ1) and
cnt(σ2) are consistent inW , g(σ1) = 1 and g(σ2) = 0. Using this observation, it is easy to construct an environment
e for a member ofW such that for every a ∈ {0, 1} there are infinitely many initial segments of e on which g outputs
a. Contradiction. 
Considering only computable classification, as opposed to noncomputable classification, a similar result to
Proposition 13 can be established using Peano arithmetics instead of Presburger arithmetics.
Proposition 14. Suppose that V is enriched with both + and ∗, L is the set of first-order sentences and D =
{P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}. Then there exists a sentence ϕ with the following properties.
• There exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) = 1 that is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
• W is not computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere.
• W is classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. Let (φi )i∈N denote an acceptable indexing of the unary partial recursive functions from N into {0, 1}. Given
i, x ∈ N, let χ(i, x) be a formula which expresses that φi (x) is undefined and let ξ(i, x) be a formula which expresses
that φi (x) is defined and equal to 0. Consider the sentence ϕ defined as
∃i∃x[i < x ∧ P(x) ∧ P(i) ∧ ∀y(y < i → ¬P(y)) ∧ (χ(i, x) ∨ (ξ(i, x)↔ P(x)))
∧ ∀y(y < x → ¬(χ(i, y) ∨ (ξ(i, y)↔ P(y))))].
So ϕ states that there are i, x ∈ N such that i < x , i = min{n ∈ N : P(n)}, P(x) and x = min{n ∈ N : φi (n) is
undefined or φi (n) = 0 ∧ P(n) or φi (n) = 1 ∧ ¬P(n)}. Let a computable classifier f have the following properties.
If cnt(σ ) contains no formula of the form P(n) then f (σ ) = 0. Otherwise let i be the least number such that
P(i) ∈ cnt(σ ). Let x be the least number such that either x ≥ |σ | or φi (x) does not converge in |σ | steps or φi (x)
converges in |σ | steps to a value different from P(x). Output 1 if P(x) ∈ cnt(σ ) and output 0 otherwise. LetM ∈W
be such that there exists a least i ∈ N such thatM |= P(i). Let e be an environment forM. If φi is not total or if φi
is total and the interpretation of P inM disagrees with φi , then f converges on e to 1 ifM |= ϕ, and to 0 otherwise.
This proves that a subset ofW ′ of measure 1 is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
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Now, suppose for a contradiction that a (partial) computable function f classifies W following ϕ almost
everywhere. By the recursion theorem [15] there is an i such that φi is the function whose graph is constructed
by the following finite extension method. Given a member σ of {0, 1}?, let σ̂ be the sequence obtained from σ by
replacing σ(n) by P(n) if σ(n) = 1 and by ¬P(n) otherwise, for all natural numbers n smaller than the length of
σ . Let σ0 = 0i1. Let σ j+1 be the first extension of σ j found such that f (σ̂ j+1) 6= f (σ̂ j ). As f converges on all
environments, there exists j ∈ N such that σ j+1 is undefined, implying that φi = ⋃k≤ j σk = σ j . Let n be the first
number where σ j (n) and thus φi (n) is undefined. Then f has to incorrectly converge on all environments for any
possible worldM in which the interpretation of P(m) is fixed for all m < n andM |= P(n), or on all environments
for any possible worldM in which the interpretation of P(m) is fixed for all m < n andM |= ¬P(n). This shows
that f does not classifyW in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere.
Finally let a noncomputable classifier f have the following properties. If cnt(σ ) contains no formula of the form
P(n) then f (σ ) = 0. Otherwise let i be the least number such that P(i) belongs to cnt(σ ). If there exists x > i such
that
• P(x) ∈ cnt(σ ),
• for all n < x , either P(n) or ¬P(n) occurs in σ ,
• x is the least n ∈ N such that either φi (n) is undefined or φi (n) is defined but disagrees with which of P(n) or
¬P(n) occurs in cnt(σ ),
then f (σ ) = 1; otherwise f (σ ) = 0. Obviously, f classifiesW in the limit following ϕ. 
5. Definability versus nondefinability of misclassified sets
The next fundamental result shows that a classifier which uses ϕ to partition the set of possible worlds might have
to misclassify a subset of W that is not only of measure 0, but also necessarily not definable. Hence almost correct
classification using ϕ is not equivalent to absolute classification with respect to a partition of the possible worlds
given by a formula almost equivalent to ϕ. It is worth noting that the next proposition uses a set of possible data that
is neither {P(n) : n ∈ N} nor {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}, henceforth exploiting the generality and flexibility allowed by
the parameter D.
Proposition 15. Assume that V is standard and L is the set of first-order sentences. For some choice ofD, there exists
ϕ ∈ L such that:
• W is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere;
• W is not classifiable in the limit following any sentence that is almost equivalent to ϕ.
Proof. Let B be the subset of N whose characteristic function can be represented as the concatenation of all strings of
even length, in lexicographic order and in increasing length. Hence the characteristic function of B can be represented
by the ω-sequence:
00 01 10 11 0000 0001 0010 . . . 1111 000000 000001 000010 . . . .
PutD = {P(n) : n ∈ B}∪{¬P(n) : n /∈ B}. As all closed members of L are finite boolean combinations of sentences
of the form P(n) and ∀x(P(sk1(x)) ∨ . . . ∨ P(skr (x))), B is not definable in L (this property is key to the proof of
the proposition). Another essential property of B used in the proof is that
(Ď) for every τ ∈ {0, 1}? there are infinitely many even numbers x such that for all y < lt(τ ), τ(y) = B(x + y).
Let ϕ be a sentence such that for all modelsM of ϕ in W , the interpretation of ϕ inM contains {P(2m) : m ≤
n}∪{P(2n + 1)} for some n ∈ N (in other words, ϕ expresses that the characteristic function of P is lexicographically
greater than the characteristic function of 2N = {0, 2, 4, ...}). Formally,
ϕ ≡ P(0) ∧ ∃x(P(x) ∧ P(s(x)) ∧ ∀y < x (P(y)↔ ¬P(s(y)))).
We first define a computable classifier f which classifies W following ϕ almost everywhere; in other words,
f converges on all environments for all members of W , but f ’s conjectures can be false in the limit on some
environments for a set of possible worlds of measure 0. The classifier f outputs 0 until it is presented with a datum
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P(n) for an odd n ∈ N or datum¬P(n) for an even n ∈ N. Then f takes this n as a parameter and computes from now
on for any stage s the set Rs consisting of all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}∩B such that P(m) has appeared in the first s elements
of the input and all members m of {0, 1, . . . , n} \ B such that ¬P(m) has not appeared in the first s elements of the
input. Note that when s is large enough, the restriction of the characteristic function of Rs to {0, 1, . . . , n} is equal to
the restriction of the characteristic function of the interpretation of P in the possible world one of whose environments
is fed to f . Let f conjecture in the limit the value 0 if the characteristic function of Rs is lexicographically smaller
than the characteristic function of 2N, and 1 if the characteristic function of 2N is lexicographically smaller than the
characteristic function of Rs . Clearly, f has the desired properties.
Now let ψ be a member of L (that is, a first-order sentence over V), and assume for a contradiction that a classifier
g classifiesW in the limit following ψ . LetM be the (unique) possible world such that {n ∈ N :M |= P(n)} = 2N.
Then there exists a locking sequence [4] for g, namely, a finite initial segment σ of D? such that M is a model of
cnt(σ ) and for all τ ∈ D?, if τ extends σ andM |= cnt(τ ) then g(τ ) is defined and equal to g(σ ). Since ψ contains
only finitely many occurrences of 0, s and variables, there exists k ∈ N such that for all σ ∈ {0, 1}?, for all e ∈ {0, 1}ω,
for all N,N′ ∈ W and for all n, n′ ≥ k, if the characteristic functions of P in N and N′ are σ(01)ne and σ(01)n′e,
respectively, then N |= ψ iff N′ |= ψ . Hence there exists k ∈ N such that:
• for all n ∈ N, if either P(n) or ¬P(n) occurs in σ then n < 2k;
• for all members τ0, τ1, . . . of {0, 1}? of even length and for all N,N′ ∈ W , if the characteristic functions of P in
N and N′ are both of the form (01)k(01)∗τ0(01)k(01)∗τ1(01)k(01)∗τ2 . . . then N |= ψ iff N′ |= ψ .
It is known from the theory of randomness that the characteristic function of any Martin–Lo¨f random set coincides
with the characteristic function of 2N on infinitely many even places for at least 2k consecutive bits. Furthermore, the
measure of all random sets starting with (01)k equals 2−2k . Fix a random set R whose characteristic function extends
(01)k . Thus we can choose some members τ0, τ1, . . . of {0, 1}? of even length such that the characteristic function of
R is of the form
(01)kτ0(01)kτ1(01)kτ2 . . . .
Using (Ď) above, there exist a0, a1, . . . ∈ N such that the set R′ whose characteristic function is (01)k+a0τ0
(01)k+a1τ1(01)k+a2τ2 . . . satisfies the following property. Given n ∈ N, put
xn =
∑
i≤n
(2k + ai )+
∑
i<n
lt(τi ).
For all n ∈ N and y < lt(τn), if y is odd and τn(y) = 1 then B(xn + y) = 0, whereas if y is even and τn(y) = 0
then B(xn + y) = 1. LetN, respectivelyN′, be the (unique) possible world such that the characteristic function of the
interpretation of P in N, respectively N′, is isomorphic to the characteristic function of R, respectively R′. Note that
all members of D that are true in N′ are also true inM. Moreover, σ is a finite initial segment of some environment
for N′. As a consequence, g converges in the limit to g(σ ) on all environments for N′ that extend σ . But since both
N and N′ agree on ψ and g is assumed to classify W in the limit following ψ , g converges in the limit to g(σ ) on
all environments for N that extend σ . It follows that all random sequences extending (01)k are classified as g(σ ).
Furthermore, the measure of all extensions of (01)k which are classified as g(σ ) is 2−2k . On the other hand, those
extensions of (01)k which are identified with models of ϕ inW have measure 2−2k/3. Therefore ϕ and ψ differ on a
class of possible worlds of positive measure. Contradiction. 
Proposition 15 cannot be generalized to arbitrary paradigms. This can be proven by using results from automata
theory, more precisely Bu¨chi automata, which are at the heart of the proof that monadic second order logic with one
successor is decidable. Recall that a subset of {0, 1}ω (or ω-language) is Bu¨chi recognizable if there exists a finite
nondeterministic automaton A with a set F of accepting states such that for all w ∈ {0, 1}ω, e belongs to S iff there
exists a run of A on w that goes infinitely often through an accepting state. The next result plays a crucial role in the
proof of Proposition 19.
Lemma 16 ([5, Theorem 3.1]). S ⊆ {0, 1}ω is Bu¨chi recognizable iff it is the disjoint union of:
• a sparse set (of measure 0);
• finitely many sets of the form R ?Y where R is a prefix free regular language and Y is an ω-language of measure 0;
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• finitely many sets R0 ? Y0, . . . , Rn ? Yn where for all i ≤ n, Ri is a regular language and Yi is an ω-language of
measure 1.
The class of Bu¨chi recognizable subsets of {0, 1}ω is closed under complements. Hence given a Bu¨chi recognizable
member S of {0, 1}ω, we can apply the previous lemma to S and denote R0 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn by A, and apply the previous
lemma to S and denote R0 ∪ · · · ∪ Rn by B, to obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 17. Let a subset S of {0, 1}ω be Bu¨chi recognizable. Then there are regular and prefix free subsets A and
B of {0, 1}? such that:
• µ(A ? {0, 1}ω ∪ B ? {0, 1}ω) = 1;
• A ? {0, 1}ω and B ? {0, 1}ω are disjoint;
• µ(A ? {0, 1}ω4 S) = 0.
Definition 18. Let a subset S of {0, 1}ω be Bu¨chi recognizable. Choose regular and prefix free A, B ⊆ {0, 1}? that
satisfy the three conditions expressed in Corollary 17. Let R+S denote A ? {0, 1}ω and R−S denote B ? {0, 1}ω.
Proposition 19. Suppose that V is standard,L is the set of monadic second-order sentences andD = {P(n),¬P(n) :
n ∈ N}. For all ϕ ∈ L,W is computably classifiable in the limit following some sentence that is almost equivalent to ϕ.
Proof. Let a sentence ϕ be given. Let S be the set of standard informants for the models of ϕ in W . By the choice
of L, S is Bu¨chi recognizable. Note that R+S is of the form C ? {0, 1}ω for a prefix-free subset C of {0, 1}?. Thus one
can easily construct a computable classifier f such that, for all standard informants (identified with environments) for
some possible world, the following holds: if e ∈ R+S then f converges to 1 on e; if e /∈ R+S then f converges to 0 on
e. Let W be the set of all possible worlds whose standard informants belong to R+S . Using [5, Theorem 3.1] again, we
infer that W is the set of models of some member ψ of L. Moreover, it follows immediately from the definition of R+S
that µ(ModW (ϕ)4W ) = 0, hence ψ is almost equivalent to ϕ. SinceW is classifiable in the limit following ψ , we
are done. 
Corollary 17 has other applications. In the following, Proposition 13 is strengthened under some modified
conditions. One considers classification from positive data only. Furthermore, one uses a different language and a
different set of possible worlds.
Proposition 20. Suppose that V is standard,L is the set of monadic second-order sentences andD = {P(n) : n ∈ N}.
1. There exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) = 1 such that for all sentences ψ ,W ′ is computably classifiable in the
limit following ψ .
2. There is a sentence ϕ such thatW is not classifiable almost everywhere in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. Let a sentence ψ be given. Let S be the set of standard informants for the models of ψ in W . Recall the
definition of R+S and R
−
S from Definition 18. Since R
+
S ∪ R−S is of the form C ? {0, 1}ω for a prefix-free subset C of{0, 1}?, there exists a computable {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}-classifier f such that for all standard informants e for some
possible world the following holds: if e ∈ R+S then f converges to 1 on e; if e ∈ R−S then f converges to 0 on e. Let
W+, respectively,W−, be the set of all possible worldsMwhose standard informants belong to R+S , respectively, R
−
S .
It follows immediately from the definitions of R+S and R
−
S that both µ(ModW (ψ)4W+) and µ(ModW (¬ψ)4W−)
are null. Hence µ(W+ ∪ W−) = 1 and W+ ∪ W− is classifiable in the limit following ψ almost everywhere. Since
the number of sentences is countable, part 1 of the proposition follows immediately.
For part 2, define ϕ as ∃x∀y(y < s(s(x)) → (P(y) ↔ x 6= y)). Suppose for a contradiction that a classifier f
classifies W almost everywhere in the limit following ϕ. Since f converges (possibly to 1) on all environments for
the possible world whose D-diagram is {P(n) : n ∈ N}, we can choose a member σ of D? such that for all τ ∈ D?
that extend σ , f (τ ) = f (σ ). Let a ∈ N be greater than all members of cnt(σ ). Put
W1 = ModW (P(0) ∧ · · · ∧ P(a) ∧ ¬P(a + 1) ∧ P(a + 2)) and
W2 = ModW (P(0) ∧ · · · ∧ P(a) ∧ ¬P(a + 1) ∧ ¬P(a + 2)).
Note that W1 ⊆ ModW (ϕ) and W2 ⊆ ModW (¬ϕ), and that both µ(W1) and µ(W2) are nonnull. But by the choice of
σ , for allM ∈ W1 ∪ W2 and for all environments e forM that extend σ , f outputs f (σ ) in response to every finite
initial segment of e that extends σ . Contradiction. 
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6. Positive only versus positive and negative data
The next result shows that being allowed to misclassify a set of possible worlds of measure 0 when classifying
from positive data does not always make up for non-access to negative data.
Proposition 21. Suppose that V is enriched with + only and L is the set of first-order sentences. Then there exists
ϕ ∈ L with the following properties.
• If D = {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N} thenW is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
• If D = {P(n) : n ∈ N} thenW is not classifiable in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere.
Proof. Define ϕ as ∃x∀y((x < y∧ y < x + x +3)→ ¬P(y)). It is immediately verified that ifD = {P(n),¬P(n) :
n ∈ N} thenW is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ (with at most one mind change).
Now suppose that D = {P(n) : n ∈ N}. Trivially, µ(ModW (ϕ)) > 0. Moreover,
µ(ModW (ϕ)) ≤ Σn∈N2−n−2 = 2−1.
For a contradiction, let a classifier f be such that f classifiesW in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere. For all
σ ∈ D?, define Uσ as the set of all M ∈ ModW (¬ϕ) such that for all τ ∈ D?, if τ extends σ and M |= cnt(τ )
then f (τ ) = 0. By the choice of f , for almost all modelsM of ¬ϕ inW , there exists σ ∈ D? withM ∈ Uσ . Since
µ(ModW (¬ϕ)) > 0, we can choose σ ∈ D? with µ(Uσ ) > 0. Denote by a the maximal number in cnt(σ ). Let U be
the set of allM ∈W with:
• M |= ¬P(a + 1) ∧ · · · ∧ ¬P(a + a + 2);
• the D-diagram of M agrees with the D-diagram of some member of Uσ , except perhaps on
{P(a + 1), . . . , P(a + a + 2)}.
Note that all members of ModW (U ) are models of ϕ. Since µ(ModW (U )) is at least equal to 2−a−2µ(Uσ ),
µ(ModW (U )) is nonnull. Let M ∈ U be given. Since the D-diagram of M is included in the D-diagram of some
member of Uσ , we infer that for all environments e for the D-diagram ofM that extend σ , f outputs 0 in response to
all finite initial segments of e that extend σ . Contradiction. 
Considering failing to classify a set of first category rather than misclassifying a set of measure 0, one can
contrast Proposition 21 with the following.
Proposition 22. Let ϕ ∈ L be such that if D = {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N} then W is classifiable, respectively,
computably classifiable, in the limit following ϕ. Assume that D = {P(n) : n ∈ N}. Then there exists a subset
W ′ ofW such that:
• W ′ is of second category;
• W ′ is classifiable, respectively, computably classifiable, in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. Assume that D = {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}. Consider a D-classifier f such that f classifies W in the limit
following ϕ. Without loss of generality we can assume that f is total and f depends only on the content of the
input and not on the order and number of repetitions of symbols. Let S be the set of all members σ of D? such that
f (τ ) = f (σ ) for all consistent τ ∈ D? that extend σ . Note that if f is computable then S is a co-r.e. set. LetW ′ be
the set of possible worlds that are models of cnt(σ ) for some σ ∈ S. By the choice of f , for all σ ∈ D?, some member
of S extends σ . This implies immediately thatW \W ′ is of first category. Fix an enumeration (τi )i∈N of D? \ S that
in the case f is computable, is itself computable.
Now assume that D = {P(n) : n ∈ N}. Define a classifier g as follows. Let σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? be given and let p
denote the length of σ . Then g(σ ) = f (τ ) for the smallest member τ of {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}? \ {τ0, . . . , τp} such
that for all n, (i) if P(n) occurs in τ then P(n) occurs in σ , (ii) if ¬P(n) occurs in τ then P(n) does not occur in σ .
Obviously, g is computable if f is computable. Moreover, for allM ∈W ′ and environments e forM (with respect to
the current choice of D), some member τ of S satisfies
• {n ∈ N : P(n) ∈ cnt(τ )} ⊆ {n ∈ N : P(n) ∈ cnt(e)},
• {n ∈ N : ¬P(n) ∈ cnt(τ )} ∩ {n ∈ N : P(n) ∈ cnt(e)} = ∅.
Hence g converges on e to f (τ ), for smallest such τ . This shows that g classifiesW ′ in the limit following ϕ. 
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7. Alternative measures
The aim of this section is to illustrate that results obtained from the canonical measure on the Cantor space do
not generalize to arbitrary measures. To this aim, we assume that µ is the measure defined by Solomonoff [16], used
to define the complexity of a string as the length of the minimal program that generates it. It is an important notion
(see [19]), hence properties of this particular µ are interesting in their own right, not only in contrast to the measure
on the Cantor space. The key properties of µ are that:
• µ is a K -recursive function from {0, 1}? into the set of rational numbers;
• for all recursive members x of {0, 1}ω, µ(x) > 0.
Note that for every recursive measure µ′, there is a recursive member x of {0, 1}ω such that µ′(x) = 0. Hence the
Solomonoff measure is only K -recursive but not recursive.
The decidability property of monadic second-order logic immediately yields the following proposition.
Property 23. Assume that V is standard and L is the set of monadic second-order sentences. For all ϕ ∈ L, if ϕ has
a model inW then µ(ModW (ϕ)) > 0.
This allows us to contrast Solomonoff’s measure with the measure on the Cantor space:
Corollary 24. For all sentences ϕ, if W is classifiable in the limit following a sentence that is almost everywhere
equivalent to ϕ, thenW is classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. By Property 23, for all sentences ϕ and ψ , ϕ and ψ are either logically equivalent or µ(ModW (ϕ ↔ ¬ψ)) >
0. The corollary follows immediately. 
Another difference between both measures is given by the next proposition, whose proof relies on another
acceptance criterion by deterministic Rabin automata. The nondeterministic Bu¨chi automata used in the previous
sections and the deterministic Rabin automata of the current section actually accept the same class of languages, but
for the purpose of the next result, Rabin automata offer a better tool. Recall that a Rabin automaton A is a deterministic
finite automaton that replaces the set of accepting states by a set X of pairs whose members are sets of states. A subset
S of {0, 1}ω is then accepted by A iff for all e ∈ {0, 1}ω, e belongs to S iff there exists (I, F) ∈ X such that the unique
run of A on e goes infinitely often through each member of I and finitely often through the members of F .
Proposition 25. Assume that V is standard and L is the set of monadic second-order sentences. Let ϕ ∈ L be given.
Then one of the following statements holds.
1. There exists n ∈ N such thatW is classifiable in the limit with at most n mind changes following φ or
2. there exists noW ′ ⊆W with µ(W ′) = 1 such thatW ′ is computably classifiable in the limit following ϕ.
Proof. By the choice ofL, there is a finite deterministic automaton A such that the set of models of ϕ inW is identified
with a subset S of {0, 1}ω such that for all e ∈ {0, 1}ω, e ∈ S iff e is accepted by A. Let Q be the set of its reachable
states. We distinguish between two cases, that correspond to the two alternatives in the statement of the proposition.
Case 1. For all q ∈ Q and x, y ∈ {0, 1}ω such that A goes through q infinitely often on the run of A on x and
on the run of A on y, A accepts x iff A accepts y. For all q ∈ Q, put Acc(q) = 1 if there exists x ∈ {0, 1}ω such
that A accepts x and A goes through q infinitely often on the run of A on x ; otherwise put Acc(q) = 0. Let f be the
unique classifier such that for all σ ∈ D?, f (σ ) = Acc(q) for the state q reached by A when run on (the member of
{0, 1}? identified with) σ . For all members q, q ′ of the same strongly connected component of A, Acc(q) = Acc(q ′).
Since Q is finite, the number of strongly connected components of A has to be an upper bound on the number of mind
changes that f can make when classifyingW in the limit following any sentence. Furthermore, for all x ∈ {0, 1}ω,
there exists a finite initial segment σ of x such that A remains in the same strong connected component C after σ has
been processed. Obviously, there has to be a member q of C such that A goes through q infinitely often when run on
x . So f accepts x iff Acc(q) = 1, which itself is equivalent to A accepting x . This shows that f correctly classifies
W in the limit following ϕ.
Case 2. There exists q ∈ Q and x, y ∈ {0, 1}ω such that A goes through q infinitely often on the run of A on x and
on the run of A on y, A accepts x and A rejects y. Notice that for all x ∈ {0, 1}ω, whether A accepts or rejects x only
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depends on the set of states that are visited infinitely often when A is run on x . It follows that there exist η, τ ∈ {0, 1}?
such that for all strings σ ∈ {0, 1}?:
• A is in state q after it has processed any of σ , ση and στ ;
• A accepts σηω and rejects στω.
Let a recursive classifier f be given. Then there exists an infinite sequence x = σ0σ1 . . . such that A is in state q after
σ0 has been processed and
σn+1 =
{
η if f (σ0σ1 . . . σn) = 0;
τ if f (σ0σ1 . . . σn) = 1.
Since f is computable, x is recursive, so µ({x}) > 0. Moreover, it is easy to verify that:
• if f converges on x to 0 then σn = η for cofinitely many n’s;
• if f converges on x to 1 then σn = τ for cofinitely many n’s.
This shows that there exists a subsetW ′ ofW with µ(W ′) > 0 such that f fails to classifiesW ′ in the limit following
ϕ. 
8. Learning witnesses
In this section, we go back to the standard measure on the Cantor space. We focus on classifiability of existential
sentences. By the choice of W , such a sentence, of the form ∃xψ(x), is true in a memberM of W iff ψ(t) is true
for some closed term t . It is then natural not only to determine that ∃xψ(x) is true, but also to learn in the limit such
a witness t . This amounts to a computation in the limit that generalizes the type of computations done by Prolog
systems. We now formalize the concepts that have just been introduced.
Definition 26. A learner is a partial function from (D ∪ {]})? into the union of {0} with the set of closed terms.
Definition 27. We say that a classifier g is associated with a learner f iff for all σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})?, g(σ ) is defined iff
f (σ ) is defined and g(σ ) = 0 iff f (σ ) = 0.
Definition 28. Let a learner f , a sentence of the form ∃xψ(x), and a subsetW ′ ofW be given.
We say that f learns ∃xψ(x) in the limit in W ′ just in the case for allM ∈ W ′ and environments e forM, the
following holds.
• IfM |= ∃xψ(x) then there exists a closed term t such thatM |= ψ(t) and the set of all σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? such that
σ ⊂ e and f (σ ) = t is cofinite.
• IfM 6|= ∃xψ(x) then {σ ∈ (D ∪ {]})? : σ ⊂ e and f (σ ) = 0} is cofinite.
Definition 29. Let a learner f and an existential sentence ϕ be given. We say that f learns ϕ in the limit inW almost
correctly just in the case:
• the classifier associated with f classifiesW in the limit following ϕ almost everywhere;
• there existsW ′ ⊆W with µ(W ′) = 1 such that f learns ϕ in the limit inW ′.
Definition 30. We say that an existential sentence ϕ is learnable, respectively, computably learnable, in the limit in
W almost correctly iff some learner, respectively, computable learner, learns ϕ in the limit inW almost correctly.
Adapting the proof of Proposition 19, we obtain an important particular case where limiting computation of
witnesses for existentially quantified sentences is always possible:
Proposition 31. Suppose that V is standard, L is the set of monadic second-order sentences and D is equal to
{P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}. Then for all existential sentences ϕ, ϕ is computably learnable in the limit in W almost
correctly.
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Proof. Let a sentence of the form ∃xψ(x) be given. Let Z be the set of all e ∈ {0, 1}ω that are identified with a
model of ∃xψ(x) inW . Let Zn be the set of all e ∈ Z , for which n is the minimal i such that ψ(i) holds. Recall the
notation of R+Z and R
−
Z given in Definition 18. So by Corollary 17, R
+
Z and R
−
Z are of respective form C
+
Z ? {0, 1}ω
and C−Z ? {0, 1}ω for regular prefix-free subsets C+Z and C−Z of {0, 1}?.
Let an extra unary predicate symbol Q be given and consider the following monadic second-order sentence ξ over
V ∪ {Q}:
∃x[ψ(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ∀y[y < x → [ ¬ψ(y) ∧ ¬Q(y)]]].
Recall that< is definable in monadic second order logic. Intuitively, ξ expresses that bothψ and Q are simultaneously
true on some value; furthermore, x is the minimum of these values.
Recall that a standard structureM over V ∪ {Q} is a structure over V ∪ {Q} such that all of its individuals interpret
a closed term. Now identify a given standard structureM over V ∪ {Q} with the unique point e in the Cantor space
such that:
• for all n ∈ N,M |= P(n) iff e(2n) = 1;
• for all n ∈ N,M |= Q(n) iff e(2n + 1) = 1.
Let S be the set of all e ∈ {0, 1}ω that are identified with a standard structure over V ∪ {Q} that is a model of ξ .
For all n ∈ N, let Sn be the set of all e ∈ S for which n is the least i ∈ N such that ψ(i) holds in e. Recall the
notation of R+S and R
−
S given in Definition 18. So by Corollary 17, R
+
S and R
−
S are of respective form C
+
S ? {0, 1}ω
and C−S ? {0, 1}ω for regular prefix-free subsets C+S and C−S of {0, 1}?. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
for all σ ∈ C+S , there exists i ∈ N such that 2i + 1 is smaller than the length of σ and σ(2i + 1) = 1. One can thus
divide C+S into regular prefix free subsets C
+
Sn
, where C+Sn consists of those sequences σ in C
+
S for which the minimal
i such that σ(2i + 1) = 1 is n. Given n ∈ N, note that Zn is same as (the set of possible worlds identified with) the
set of restrictions to V of the members of Sn . Now let R+Sn = C+Sn ? {0, 1}ω. Let C+Zn be the set of sequences of the
form σ(0)σ (2)σ (4) . . . where σ ranges over C+Sn . Let R
+
Zn
= C+Zn ? {0, 1}ω. Using Corollary 17, R+Sn differs from Sn
on a set of measure 0. As the interpretation of Q(i) in all members of Sn is fixed for all i ≤ n, but arbitrary for all
i > n, µ(Sn) = 2−(n+1)µ(Zn). Thus, R+Zn differs from Zn on a set of measure 0. Using regularity of C+Sn , it follows
that C+Zn , n ∈ N, are regular sets (which could be made prefix free), which intersect neither with each other nor with
C−Z . Moreover, one can effectively find elements of the sets C
−
Z and C
+
Zn
, effectively from each n.
Now let a computable {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N}-classifier f be defined as follows. Let a standard informant e for
some possible world (that is, standard structure over V , not V ∪ {Q}!) be given.
• Suppose that e extends a member σ of C+Zn . Then, f outputs n in response to cofinitely many finite initial segments
of e.
• If e extends a member of C−Z then f is constant and equal to 0 on e.
It follows that
• for all n ∈ N, f converges to n on almost every (standard environment identified with a) member of R+Zn ;
• f converges to 0 on almost every member of R−Z .
Hence ∃xψ(x) is computably learnable in the limit inW almost correctly. 
When investigating the connections between classifiability and learnability of sentences of the form ∃xψ(x), it is
reasonable to assume that W is classifiable in the limit following any of the sentences ψ(n); otherwise one could
obtain a separation by taking a sentence ξ such thatW is not almost everywhere classifiable in the limit following ξ
and then consider
∃x ((x = 0 ∧ ¬ξ) ∨ (x = 1 ∧ ξ)).
Furthermore, ifW is classifiable in the limit following each of the formulas ∃xψ(x) and ψ(n) with n ∈ N, then the
parameter x is also learnable: an n ∈ N such that ψ(n) holds can be found in the limit. Still computability might be
lost, for example with ∃x (φx is total ∧φx (0) = min{z : Pz}∧∀y < x (φy 6= φx )).As this example can be formalized
in full arithmetic, it is natural to ask what happens if one only postulates thatW is almost everywhere classifiable in
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the limit following ∃xψ(x), keeping the other conditions as such. The next result shows that not only computability,
but also learnability can be lost.
Proposition 32. Suppose that V is enriched with+ only, L is the set of first-order sentences andD = {P(n),¬P(n) :
n ∈ N}. Let ψ(x) be the formula
∀y∃u∃v∃w (x + y + v = u ∧ u + w = x + x + y + y ∧ P(u)).
Then:
• the set of models of ∃xψ(x) inW is of measure 1;
• for all n ∈ N,W is classifiable in the limit with at most 1 mind change following ψ(n);
• ∃xψ(x) is not almost correctly learnable in the limit inW .
Proof. The formula ψ(x) expresses that for every y ∈ N, there exists u ∈ N such that x + y ≤ u ≤ 2x +2y and P(u)
holds. By the law of large numbers, µ(ModW (∃xψ(x))) is equal to 1. Given n ∈ N, a classifier that outputs 1, until it
finds y ∈ N such that ¬P(n + y), . . . ,¬P(2n + 2y) all appear in the data, at which point it outputs 0, classifiesW in
the limit with at most 1 mind change followingψ(n). Suppose for a contradiction that a learner f learns ∃xψ(x) in the
limit inW almost correctly. It is then easy to construct a ⊆-increasing sequence (σn)n∈N of members of D? such that:
• for all i ∈ N, σ2i is an initial segment of an environment for a model of ψ(n), for some n, and f outputs n in
response to σ2i ;
• for all i ∈ N, σ2i+1 is an initial segment of an environment for a model of ¬∃xψ(x) and f outputs 0 in response
to σ2i+1;
• ⋃i∈N σi is an environment for a possible world.
Since the classifier associated with f does not converge on
⋃
i∈N σi , it follows that f does not learn ∃xψ(x) almost
correctly in the limit inW . 
A further question would be the following. Given a sentence ϕ such thatW can be classified in the limit following
ϕ, is ϕ equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃xψ(x) such that W is classifiable with a constant number of mind
changes, following any sentence of the form ψ(n)? The answer is yes for computable classification in full arithmetic
since one can transform every learner into a formula monitoring its behaviour and then quantify over a variable that
represents the last time when the classifier makes a wrong conjecture.
9. Conclusion
In this paper the relationship between classifying all possible worlds and classifying almost all possible worlds
has been investigated. The main results include the following. In the case of monadic second order logic with one
successor, which is well known to be decidable thanks to its connections with Bu¨chi automata, one can classify
W following a formula ϕ almost everywhere from both positive and negative data. But with positive data only,
convergence might fail on a set of measure 0. For other choices of possible data, W might even be classifiable in
the limit following a given sentence ϕ almost everywhere, though no sentence differing from ϕ only on a null set
of worlds allows for absolute classification. With Presburger arithmetic, there is a sentence ϕ such that some set of
worlds of measure 1 can be classified in the limit following ϕ, though no classifier which is correct on a set of measure
1 converges on all environments for all possible worlds. The fact that these results depend crucially on the choice of
measure as the standard measure on the Cantor space has been emphasized by considering the measure proposed
by Solomonoff. Finally, some connections were made between classification and learning of an essential parameter,
namely, the value of the first quantified variable in an existential sentence. It turns out that this can be achieved on a set
of worlds of measure 1 in monadic second order logic with one successor, demonstrating that Prolog style inferences
are almost everywhere possible in this case.
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